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The Laws of War in the Pre-Dawn Light:
Institutions and Obligations in Thucydides'
Peloponnesian War
STEVE SHEPPARD•

This Essay in honor of Oscar Schachter criticizes both
ahistorical renderings of the law of war and realist
depictions of Peloponnesian War by asking whether
Thucydides describes the conditions of a law of war.
Examining the history in detail, Sheppard considers
whether Thucydides described a sufficient institutional
structure to recognize and enforce an intermunicipal
law during war, as well as concepts of jus ad bellum
and jus in bello. Despite the tradition of reading
Thucydides as a realist, this Essay concludes that a
more accurate reading would be that Thucidydes not
only describes a form of a law of war but provided
ample evidence of the benefits of its acceptance and
the dangers of its breach.
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* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. This Article is
dedicated to the memory of Professor Oscar Schachter, whose gentle but persistent teaching
was a model that has improved the lives and knowledge of my own students. My thanks to
Nick Boeving, Amitabh Chibber, and the staff of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
for their assistance. This Article is an elaboration of a lecture given at Downing College,
Cambridge, in its summer school, in a consortium that the college sponsors with the law
schools of the Universities of Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Nebraska. I am grateful
for the hospitality shown to me and our students by the college, especially by John Hopkins
and Graham Virgo.
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Any reader ofThucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War will detect a modem ring in the
reasoning and techniques used by the Greek city-states in diplomatic practices, in treaties of
alliance, and in certain elementary rules of war. Disputes were sometimes submitted to
arbitration. However, relations between Greeks and non-Greeks were not regulated in the
same \)ay; the latter were regarded by the Greeks as barbarians, and not as moral or legal
equals.

These lines, from the casebook long associated with
international law at Columbia Law School, suggest to the current
generation an ancient source from which to examine the ideas that
underpin the law of war. 2 Yet contemporary academic discussions of
the law of war rarely consider the ancient world. Recent American
and European studies of international law tend to give antiquity short
shrift, even texts dedicated to the history of law among states. 3 This
is generally true of casebooks and teaching materials4 as well as
monographs. More pertinently, studies dedicated to the history of the
law of war are prone to omit the classical era. 5 At best, despite the
1. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxviii
(West Publishing 4th ed. 2001).
2. The lines themselves were likely penned by Professor Friedmann, and they have
been retained in each edition. See WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (West Publishing 1969). My thanks to Professor Louis Henkin for
reviewing his notes in this regard.
3. Willhelm Grewe's great achievement, The Epochs of International Law,
commenced its study with the medieval unity of the church and the empire. WILLHELM
GEORG GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers trans., Walter de
Gruyter 2d ed. 2000). In Arthur Nussbaum's classic summary, the whole of interstate
relations in Asia, Greece, and Rome occupied a scant fifteen pages, despite his general
interest in classical predicates to international law. Compare ARTHUR C. NuSSBAUM, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (Macmillan 1947) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM,
HISTORY] with Arthur Nussbaum, The Significance of Roman Law in the History of
International Law, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 678 (1952).
4. While indeed some books-such as the new Carter, Trimble, Bradley-include a
greater share of historical sources, the Columbia text quoted above remains striking in its
emphasis on an historical introduction to the field. See David J. Bederman, International
Law Casebook: Tradition, Revision, and Pedagogy, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 207 (2004)
(reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES
AND MATERIALS (Foundation Press 5th ed. 2001); BARRY E. CARTERET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Aspen Publishers 2003); DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1; JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH (Aspen
2002); MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
(West Group 2d ed. 2001).
5. Even the volumes dedicated to the law of war in Verzijl's monumental history have
few references to the time before the dawn of the early modem state. See 9-11 JAN HENDRIK
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now venerable instruction of Friedmann and company, Thucydides'
lessons for students of the modem law of war remain underexamined.
I.

HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

We recurrently imagine international law as proceeding from a
new understanding of the state following some benchmark, such as
the fall of Rome, or the Peace of Westphalia, or the advent of the
United Nations. The military or political affairs that either preceded
this imagined horizon, or that occurred in regions of the world
unaffected by the benchmark, are excluded from examination.
There are, of course, both practical and theoretical reasons to
emphasize modem events in examining modem law. Practically,
international lawyers must be preoccupied with the application of
custom and treaties to questions of immediate concern. In such
applications, our sense of the appropriate sources is often bounded by
a preference for the recent. Perhaps most fundamentally, there is a
sense that our times are different, that we have little or nothing to gain
from looking to the past for guidance. Yet practical concerns are
hardly likely to explain an academic discipline governed by theory.
Theoretically, Twentieth Century international law was
dominated by positivists and statists, whose concept of international
law is limited to rules voluntarily created by states-a concept that is
Oppenheim's
itself given a narrow framework of definition.
influential definition enshrining both concepts at the dawn of the
Twentieth Century necessarily commenced with the post-Westphalian
state. "International Law as a law between Sovereign and equal states
based on the common consent of these States is a product of modem
Christian civilization .... "6 Even absent the religious veneer,
Oppenheim's defmition relied on the existence of the state in the
modem sense, the subject of the law, to determine the existence of

WILLEM VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (A.W. Sijthoff 19681998) (Vol. 9, Inter-State Disputes and Their Settlements, is divided between part 9a (vol. 9)
The Laws of War, part 9b (vol. 10) The Law ofNeutrality, and part 9c (vol. 11) The Law of
Maritime Prize). Even so, Verzijl does note the ancient enforcement ofjus ad bellum against
Aratos, discussed infra note 48.
6. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Longmans, Green, & Co. 1905). More
recent depictions of the development of international law are less prone to rely on such
religious language but still ascribe its development to European expansion. See, e.g., THE
EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 2 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., Clarendon
Press 1984).
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intemationallaw. 7 This emphasis on the state as the dominant (if not
the only) actor in the international legal system has been both cause
and result of a notion of international law dependent upon institutions
that did not exist prior to modem times, or even until the later
Twentieth Century. As Nussbaum noted, "[a] distinct concept of the
law of nations as a law prevailing among independent states has
emerged from earlier vague notions only during the last few
centuries." 8 The juristic use of "law" and "states" had yet to evolve. 9
The concept of international law, of course, need not be seen
only through the narrowed lenses of institutional positivism or
academic essentialism. Some of the most interesting recent theory in
international law has been the comparative examination of
international norms developed and enforced outside of the
Westphalian model. 10 Despite its antecedents, 11 the comparative study
of international law, particularly of the history of international law,
remains a nascent field, its methodology still evolving and embracing
wider fields of scholarship. 12 Of these, one of the most significant is
the restoration to international law scholarship of history as a
7. "The necessity of a Law of Nations did not arise until a multitude of States
independent of one another had successfully established themselves." OPPENHEIM, supra
note 6, at 54. For Oppenheim, the genesis of the law of nations was Grotian. /d. at 54-85.
That view, though, was challenged quickly, albeit not from a classical view but from other
early modem views, which rightly argued for stronger antecedents in the writing of Vitoria.
See, e.g., I JAMES B. SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FRANCISCO DE
VITO RIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS (Clarendon Press 1934).
8. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF LAW OF NATIONS ix (Macmillan rev.
ed. 1954) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HISTORY (rev'd)]. See also GEORGE A. FINCH, THE
SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW I (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1937).
9. Even so, Nussbaum continued and noted that a more extensive inquiry required the
study of "[i]nterrelations of the most diverse human groups bearing some resemblance to
states and, on the other hand, norms of a purely religious character." NUSSBAUM, HISTORY
(rev' d), supra note 8, at ix.
10. See, e.g., Onuma Yasuaki, When Was the Law of International Society Born?-An
Inquiry of the History of International Law from an lntercivilizational Perspective, 2 J. HIST.
INT'L L. 1 (2000).
11. See, e.g., HENRY SUMNER MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SERIES OF LECTURES
DELNERED BEFORE THE UNNERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 1887 (J. Murray 2d ed. 1894).
Nussbaum gives a nice, if necessarily sparse, historiography of international law to midcentury. See NUSSBAUM, HISTORY, supra note 3, at 293-98.
12. For an argument that comparative approaches are essential to the history of
international law, see Ingo J. Hueck, The Discipline of the History of International LawNew Trends and Methods on the History of International Law, 3 J. HIST. INT'L L. 194, 217
(2001). The comparative study of international law has had a wider influence than history
alone. A significant thread, occasioned by the influence of competing religions, has been
much advanced by the studies recently revised by Mark Janis. See RELIGION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., Brill Academic Publishers
2004).
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discipline 13-particularly ancient history-a movement led in the
United States predominately by David Bederman. 14
And a restoration it is.
One aspect of the study of
international law within the limits described above is that the focus on
the contemporary state is in fact of rather recent vintage.
Commentators from Grotius to Kent saw nothing amiss in basing their
arguments on ancient sources. 15 Early modem writers considered the
law of nations to be a general, if not a universal, aspect of law. 16
Indeed, one of the most extended discussions of international law in
the ancient world was not completed until the early Twentieth
Century. 17 Still, the law of war remains, in most contemporary
13. For this practice in Germany, see Hueck, supra note 12. See also Olga V.
Butkevych, History ofAncient International Law: Challenges and Prospects, 5 J. HIST. INT'L
L. 189 (2003). For more general discussions, see Onuma Yasuaki, The Birth of International
Law as the Law ofInternational Society, 94 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 44 (2000).
14. There are, obviously, other candidates for the vein of this charge, but Bedennan's
work has been particularly significant. See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN ANTIQUITY (Cambridge University Press 2001) (hereinafter BEDERMAN, ANTIQUITY].
Other texts have shown a renewed emphasis on the study of the origins of international
relations. For a careful study of international order, reflecting the work of classicists such as
W. Kendrick Pritchett, see INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN POLITICAL THOUGHT: TEXTS FROM
THE ANCIENT GREEKS TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR (Chris Brown et al. eds., Cambridge
University Press 2002).
15. On Grotius, see A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR: PEACE, WAR, AND JUSTICE IN
HUGO GROTIUS (Onuma Yasuaki ed., Clarendon Press 1993); David J. Bedennan, Reception
of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius' De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, lO EMORY
INT'L L. REv. I (1996). For use of the ancients by pre-Grotian writers, see, e.g., Cornelius F.
Murphy, Jr., The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1982). On Kent,
see John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 547, 570 n.ll5 (1993). See also JAMES KENT, I COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 49 (William Kent 6th ed. 1848). Interesting to our current purpose, Kent did not consider the
law of ancient Greece to be international law in the fullest sense so long as it was based on
the consent of the cities alone. Rather, he saw it as only developing once the Amphictyonic
Council was established to instill ongoing order. !d. at 5. See, however, note 27 infra.
16. Montesquieu is both typical and influential:
The law of nations is naturally founded on this principle, that different nations
ought in time of peace to do one another all the good they can, and in time of
war as little injury as possible, without prejudicing their real interests.
The object of war is victory; that of victory is conquest; and that of conquest
preservation. From this and the preceding principle all those rules are derived
which constitute the law of nations.
All countries have a law of nations, not excepting the Iroquois themselves,
though they devour their prisoners: for they send and receive ambassadors, and
understand the rights of war and peace. The mischief is that their law of nations
is not founded on true principles.
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, l THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 2-3 (Thomas Nugent trans., Colonial Press
1900).
17. See l, 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME (Macmillan 1911 ).
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studies, a wholly contemporary exercise; usually beginning in the era
of Francis Lieber. 18 This field, too, has begun to return to its roots. 19
II.

ANCIENT GREECE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

With such a preface, returning to the "modem ring" of
Thucydides provides reason for excitement as well as caution. Legal
history is never without the danger of anachronism. The subtle tugs
of contemporary thought and concerns must be carefully directed in a
study of different times and cultures, not only to assess the past more
accurately but also to inform the present more usefully. We can
usefully ask modem questions and even apply current modes of
analysis, but we must recognize that there will likely be an imperfect
fit between the questions of the present and the answers of the past.
There are obvious reasons why the intermunicipal relations in
ancient Greece differ from interstate relations in the modem world.
The similarities, though, are too profound to be ignored. One might
speculate that they result from a rough ancestry, that the modem
international law is descended from the Roman jus gentium, itself
modeled in part on Greek legal antecedents. I suspect that this
extended line of causation is too weak to bear much weight in the
light ofhistorical rigor. Rather, the similarities appear to me to result
from something more fundamental. Although the question is far
afield from this Essay, it may be that some of these similarities result
from practical necessity, some from contingent similarities between
cultures, some from recurrent expression of core human values, and
some, indeed, from the knowing repetition of past acts.
The exploration in this Essay, however, is not so broad as to
answer such questions. It is not even so broad as to delineate the
conduct of the Greek states in the fourth century B.C.E., a task
essential to defining the causes of these parallels. Rather, it seeks to
put forth one ancient writer's perspective on what we might discern,
for our contemporary purposes, as the significance of the acts and
18. On Lieber, see Steve Sheppard, Guerilla Parties, the Lieber Code, and the Law of
War, in FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES (forthcoming 2005) (on file with the author). One of the more influential collections
of materials on the law of war commences with a near contemporary pronouncement, the
Paris Declaration of 1856 Respecting Maritime Law. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
47-52 (Adam Roberts & Rich Guelffeds., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2000).
19. The best of the new studies in general is the ·collection of essays by Howard,
Andreopoulos, and Shulman. See THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE
WESTERN WORLD (Michael Howard et al. eds., Yale University Press 1994).
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ideas depicted. Specifically, this Essay seeks to examine more
closely the practices Thucydides depicted of diplomacy, treaty,
alliance, arbitration, and conduct in war, which may illuminate the
reasoning and technique so resonant to the modem ear. Among the
questions of this significance, it is reasonable to ask whether we can
discern in the text obligations or institutions that are meaningfully
similar to a law of war.
III.

THUCYDIDES AND THE REALIST DISTRACTION

For some readers, it may be a surprise to ask such questions of
Thucydides. Peloponnesian War has long been a banner for the
legions of realists in international relations who argue that there are
not, in fact, any obligations upon states (if not upon warriors) that
correspond to a law of war. Much of this argument rests on his
purported transcript of the Athenian envoys to Melos in the sixteenth
year of the war, or 416 B.C.E., in which the Athenians made clear
they were basing their argument on power rather than justice:
For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious
pretenses-either of how we have a right to our empire
because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking
you because of wrong that you have done us-and
make a long speech which would not be believed; and
in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to
influence us by saying that you did not join the
Spartans, although their colonists, or that you have
done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding
in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know
as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in
question between equals in powers, while the strong do
what they can and the weak suffer what they must. 20
From such lines comes Thucydides' place in international
relations literature as the grandfather of realism, whether seen as raw
20. THUCYDIDES, PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 5.89, reprinted in THE LANDMARK
THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSNE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 352 (Robert B.
Strassler ed., Richard Crawley trans., Free Press 1996) [hereinafter PW, and cited according
to the convention for this text of notation to book, chapter, and line, unless the reference is to
the Strassler text, which will be noted as STRASSLER, LANDMARK]. Crawley's translation, as
modified either by Strassler or myself, is used throughout this article, and it is available in
many editions, most usefully at http://classics.mit.eduffhucydides/pelopwar.htrn1 (last visited
Mar. 5, 2005), which is based on THuCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (E.P. Dutton ed.,
1910).
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power politics or the depiction of international anarchy, a distinction
of significance to realists. 21 Even so, the unexamined depiction of
Thucydides as a realist is in decline. 22 While this depiction has some
appropriate vitality, his "realist" passages, such as the Melian
dialogue, must be tempered with his presentation of conflicting views
of the role of power, justice, and law, such as the passages in the
speeches of Pericles and even Nicias. 23 Moreover, there is no inherent
foundation for barring an idea of a law of war from a realist position,
if realism is to be considered as something more than a mere contest
for economic or military superiority. A state may act from political
interests, including its interest in its reputation as law-abiding,
humane, just, or even reliable. These interests recur throughout
Peloponnesian War.
The realist depiction of Thucydides cannot answer whether
there is evidence in his work of a concept of a law of war. There is
much more to examine before we can discern whether Thucydides
depicts obligations or institutions that are meaningfully similar to a
law of war, or what reasons there may be for them.
IV.

SEARCHING FOR THE LAW OF WAR IN THUCYDIDES

To consider the law of war in Thucydides is to examine the
text through two lenses. The first is an awareness of the obligations
21. Daniel Garst, Thucydides and Neorealism, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 3 (1989). In its
broader aspects, this concept of realism is usually and rightly presented with its Thucydidean
roots, although this may have the unintended effect of placing Thucydides in theoretical
opposition to other bases of international law. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How Is
International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1402 (1998).
22. See, e.g., MARK V. KAUPPI & PAUL R. VIOTTI, THE GLOBAL PHILOSOPHERS: WORLD
POLITICS IN WESTERN THOUGHT 50 (Lexington Books 1992).
23. On this point, see Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in
International Relations, 48 INT. ORG. 131 (1994). Bagby criticizes the bald designation of
Thucydides as a "realist" in international relations, asserting Thucydides' emphasis on
national character, the character of leaders, and the moral arguments of Hellenistic political
rhetoric support a stronger claim for Thucydides' moral argument for city action than realists
ackriowledge in their depictions of his inter-municipal relations. Most importantly, Bagby
illustrates the notion that what Thucydides wrote of the Athenian arguments about their own
actions is not dispositive of Thucydides' view of their affairs. !d. at 137-39. The Periclean
appeal to personal honor and virtue that Thucydides reports is a more telling argument that
Thucydides may value virtue above interest alone. See PW, supra note 20, 2.35.1-2.46.2,
discussed further in the text i'lfra note 31. As to Nicias, there are two distinct interpretations
of his great speech against the invasion of Sicily, in itself an inventory of the interests of
Athens that would be harmed by the expedition. The first is a clear-eyed, realist appraisal of
a bad idea. The second is an argument for peace, supported by interest. See PW, supra note
20, 6.9.1-6.14.1. Thucydides' own views on the law of the Greeks are considered further in
the text accompanying notes 53-61, infra.
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and institutions of the modem laws of war. The second is to consider
what actions and motives Thucydides depicts that might represent an
ancient understanding of obligations or institutions governing the city
or the warrior.
At its most elemental, a law of war, if one is to be found in
Thucydides or anywhere else, must at least be a broadly understood
concept of rules by which the actors-a state and its warriors-are
under obligations to restrain from certain types of conduct. At this
breadth of defmition, these obligations take three forms: obligations
upon states in specific circumstances that might start a conflict,
obligations binding warriors to keep them from certain acts while
engaging in battle, and obligations on both states and warriors in
managing military circumstances less than battles, such as
occupations or keeping prisoners. Generally, the first obligations,
restraints from war, are now called the jus ad bellum, and the second
and third the jus in bello, although many topics blur this distinction. 24
An inquiry into obligations resonant of the laws of war may fruitfully
consider obligations of these two types.
Yet obligations, particularly those that can be reduced to rules
or specific laws, are but one aspect of the law of war, as they are of
international law more broadly. As Oscar Schachter has rightly said,
"international law is more appropriately viewed as an institution than
as a set of rules." 25 For most modem lawyers reading Thucydides to
find a law of war that might vaguely be considered a legal system,
there must be some form of institutional framework for the
recognition, adjudication, and change of the actors' obligations. 26
24. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 18, at 1-2. Despite the
scholastic tenor of the terms and their explanatory power, the terms jus in bello and jus ad
bellum are Twentieth Century neologisms, coined apparently in the 1930s, perhaps by the
Viennese scholar of international law Josef Kunz. See Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin
Terms Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, 320 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 553 (1997). My thanks to
George Fletcher for pointing me to this reference. Of course, one reason why it would be
unexpected to find earlier parallelism between the terms for law on the battlefield and law
governing the commencement of hostilities is that the legal framework for the two ideas was
hardly parallel. While institutional means existed for recognizing the rules of each and
adjudicating claims for their breach, only in the twentieth century were these merged into
common institutions.
25. Oscar Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International
Society, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE, AND THEORY 745, 746 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., Martinus Nijhoff 1983).
26. This is, obviously, the Hartian concept of law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1994). The breadth of positivism I intend here does
not, however, require that the institutions be based on a single rule of recognition, or on
legislation, or on paper transactions, only that the mechanisms of such institutions be ongoing
and discemable. This would suggest that such institutions are less central examples of a legal
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The search for evidence of a nascent law of war can then be
considered to have three strains: a set of obligations corresponding to
jus ad bellum, a set of obligations corresponding to jus in bello, and
some institutional frameworks for the recognition and adjudication of
these obligations. Taking our cue from Professor Schachter, the
institutional framework is essential regardless of what rules exist, and
so the search commences with that strain.
V.

INSTITUTIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ADJUDICATION OF
THE WARRIOR'S OBLIGATIONS

The independent city-states of Fourth- and Fifth Century
Greece had no permanent association or tribunal to which all
belonged and which was invested with permanent authority to declare
the law or resolve disputes. Still, there were several practices-in
which the city-states had a deep investment and to which their
individual claims or immediate interests were subordinate-that
persisted sufficiently over time for these practices to be considered
legal institutions, at least in a weak form. Such practices included
consultation with the oracle of Delphi, the use of neutral states as
arbitrators, and the constitutional expectations of municipal decisions
based on a pan-Hellenic ideal of law. The practice that was most
clearly independent of the cities was the authority of the oracle at
Delphi. Protected by an amphictyony, or religious league, of fourteen
cities, Delphi was freely consulted by all cities, and its declarations
were considered to be both disinterested and dispositive on matters of
war and peace. 27
Thucydides records frequent contact between the cities and
Delphi. The custom of free access to Delphi was specifically
enshrined as the first term in the Athenian-Spartan armistice of 423. 28
The nature of consultations included political questions as
well as arbitrations of interstate relations. When, for example, the
Epidamnian colonists realized they would not be protected by their
founders in Corcyra, they consulted the Delphic oracle, and followed

system, which is probably correct.
27. There were many amphictyonies in classical Greece, dedicated to the service of
temples of many Gods. The Delphic Amphictyonic Council is merely the best known. On
the practice generally, and how it related to the treaty process, see BEDERMAN, ANTIQUITY,
supra note 14, at 168-71. On the inter-relationship between the religious and legal in the
amphictyonies, see 2 PHILLIPSON, supra note 17, at 3-11.
28. PW, supra note 20, 4.118.1.
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her answer to seek the protection of Corinth. 29 The oracle's
commands were also followed in interstate relations, and even in
military matters by the great powers. In 421, Thucydides notes that
Athens, "moved by her misfortunes in the field and by the commands
of the god at Delphi," returned the Delians, whom it had expelled
from their city the year before, to their city. 30 Uncharacteristically,
Thucydides does not make clear at that point in the text what
misfortunes he means, particularly as Athens had just then won a
victory against Scione. 31 The Spartans also consulted Delphi, as in
426, when Sparta, wanting such a basis rather badly, at least officially
based its decision to colonize Heraclea on a Delphic answer. 32
In both instances, Thucydides took care-in the case of the
Delians perhaps extraordinary care-to demonstrate that the
supplicant's interests or preferences coincided with the oracle's
answer, and it is tempting to dismiss these Delphic pronouncements
as either good politics or weak law. Yet Thucydides quite famously
sought to diminish his reliance on divine causes, a goal that in itself
may explain his balance between reliance on interests and narrative of
divine arbitration in these passages' narrative. Nearly all the
opposing parties invoked arbitration throughout the war. Each side
usually acknowledged the other's right to its arbitration, even if the
number of successful arbitrations that Thucydides records is not as
great as those that failed. A city's right to arbitration was apparently
customary, an aspect of the pan-Hellenic law, but it was also
enshrined in treaties and truces. The law forbade the treatment of a
claimant to arbitration as a malefactor. 33 By custom, arbitration could
take the form either of referral to a third party or trial by battle. 34
Thucydides expends considerable effort in setting the stage for
the first conflict between Athens and Sparta, which depended on two
separate failures by states to secure claims for arbitration. In the
growing dispute in 435 between Corcyrus and Corinth over
Epidamnus (which was then under a blockade), each side offered to
refer the dispute to arbitration at Delphi, if the other would withdraw
29. !d. 1.25.
30. !d. 5.32.1. The expulsion of the Delians to Atramyrium in Asia minor had been for
presumed religious impurity and is described at id. 5 .1.1.
31. !d. 5.33.1.
32. !d. 3.92.5.
33. !d. 1.85.2. Bederman notes, though, that while the oracle was often consulted as an
arbitrator, the oracle was not very good at it. See BEDERMAN, ANTIQUITY, supra note 14, at
83.
34. PW, supra note 20, 5.41.
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troops already in place. Neither side did so, and Corinth declared
war. 35 This episode became a significant part of the Corcyraean
complaint against Corinth to other cities, particularly to Athens at a
conference in 433. "[T]hat Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited
to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, they chose to
prosecute their complaints by war rather than by a fair trial."36 This
charge stung enough that the Corinthians went to some lengths to
attempt to refute it. 37 At the close of the conference, Thucydides tells
us there were two assemblies, the second of which resolved to enter
into a defensive alliance of mutual assistance with the Corcyraeans. 38
This alliance was a definite step toward war between the two great
powers, Athens and Sparta, both of which had strong relations with
Corinth. War between Corinth and Corcyra broke out soon after, with
Corinth's advance checked by Athenian intervention. 39
Corinth then petitioned Sparta, along with other members of
the Lacaedemonian League, to counter . the growing Athenian
influence and to declare Athens in violation of its treaty with Sparta.
Athenian representatives at the Lacaedemonian conference also called
for arbitration, basing their claim on interest, oaths in the old treaties,
and the witness to those oaths by the gods. 40 The Spartan king
35. Id. 1.28-1.29.
36. Id. 1.34.3.
37. The narrative is extensive but interesting in its approach. Effectively, the
Corinthians argued (if self-servingly leaving out their own indiscretion) that the Corcyraean
request for arbitration was in bad faith.
[ 1] As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first submitted to
arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the party who is safe in a
commanding position cannot gain the credit due only to him who, before
appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places himself on a level with his
adversary. [2] In their case, it was not before they laid siege to the place, but
after they at length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they
thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own
misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them not in
alliance, but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their being at enmity with
us. [3] But it was when they stood firmest that they should have made overtures
to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged and they are in peril; nor
yet at a time when you will be admitting to a share in your protection those who
never admitted you to a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal
amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had no hand. No,
they should have shared their power with you before they asked you to share
your fortunes with them.
Id. 1.39.1-1.39.3.
38. Id. 1.44-1.45. Of course, the Athenian decision to ally with Corcyra was not, itself,
an adjudication of the arbitration offered between it and Corinth. That arbitration never
occurred.
39. See id. 1.46-1.66.
40. Id. 1.78.4.
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Archidamus, to whom Thucydides attributed a "reputation of being at
once a wise and a moderate man,"41 maintained that Sparta should
wait for arbitration, albeit using the time for quite practical ends:
As for the Athenians, send to them on the matter of
Potidaea, send on the matter of the alleged wrongs of
the allies, particularly as they are prepared to submit
matters to arbitration, for one should not proceed
against a party who offers arbitration as one would
against a wrongdoer.
Meanwhile do not omit
preparation for war. This decision will be the best for
yourselves and the most terrible to your opponents. 42
Archidamus, however, did not prevail with his people, who
voted to declare the treaty broken and for war, thereby refusing the
offer to arbitrate. 43
It would be hasty to conclude from these episodes that
arbitration was disfavored among city leaders, voluntary rather than
binding, uncommon, or disfavored in general by Thucydides. On the
contrary, Thucydides had good reason to emphasize lost opportunities
in the lengthy speeches favoring these arbitrations. Their failure
sparked the war between the Peloponnese and the Athenians that
"went on for a very long time," and during which Athens and the
Hellenes suffered "disasters of a kind and number that no other
similar period of time could match. •>44 There are, to be certain, other
instances in which one side refused to arbitrate a dispute, but most are
condemned in one manner or another.
In 413, very near the middle of both the war and his narrative,
Thucydides revisited the Spartans' refusal to arbitrate their claims
against the Athenians, prompting the war. Even as the Spartans
prepared to invade in the by-then second war, Thucydides believed
they took heart from having a more just cause than they had in the
first war.
In the former war, they considered that the offense had
been more on their own side, both on account of the
attack of the The bans on Plataea in time of peace, and
also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer
of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty
41.
42.
43.
44.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

1.79.2.
1.85.2.
1.87.3.
1.9.1.
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that where arbitration should be offered there should
be no appeal to arms. For this reason they thought that
they deserved their misfortunes, and took to heart
seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had
befallen them. 45
In the second war, the Spartans believed they should prevail,
because the Athenians were guilty of the offense for which the
Spartans had already been punished.
When upon every dispute that arose as to the
interpretation of any doubtful point in the treaty, their
own offers of arbitration were always rejected by the
Athenians-the Spartans at length decided that Athens
had now committed the very same offense as they had
before done, and had become the guilty party; and they
began to be full of enthusiasm for the war. 46
Thucydides reports another arbitration that was unsuccessful,
owing in that case to the belief by one side that the arbitrators had
been biased. 47 In fact, the record for Thucydides is harsher toward
arbitration than that available to Herodotus or later chroniclers, 48 for
all of his apparent commitment to the right to an arbitral hearing. 49
The constitutional expectations of municipal decisions were
based on a pan-Hellenic ideal of law. Of course, domestic laws
settling private and commercial matters within the city-state were
routinely applied among citizens, and although Athens had the most
45. !d. 7.18.2.
46. !d. 7 .18.3. Athens had notably refused to arbitrate a dispute over the rebellion of
Scione. /d. 4.122.4-4.122.5.
47. !d. 5.31. The Lepreans took the Eleans before the Lacaedemonians in a dispute
over tribute, and the Lacaedemonians found for the Lepreans. The Eleans rejected the award,
claiming Spartan bias, and invaded.
48. One favorite example occurs two centuries later. Aratos, the General of Sicyon and
leader of the Achaean league, was fined for a breach of the custom of war. In 242, he led an
attack on Argos, with which Sicyon was at peace, but where he had expected to spark a revolt
against the tyrant Aristippos. The revolt never came, and Aratos retreated. Aristippos
brought a charge against Aratos for breaching the peace, which was arbitrated by the
Mantineans. The Mantineans granted Aristippos nominal damages of thirty minae. See
Plutarch, Aratos, in PLUTARCH, LIVES (John Dryden trans., Arthur Hugh Clough ed., 1998);
see also F.W. WALBANK, ARATOS OF SICYON 56 (Cambridge University Press 1933).
49. Several times, the right to arbitration is vindicated, even if an arbitral award is not.
See, e.g., PW, supra note 20, 5.41, in which the Spartans recognized an Argive claim for
arbitration.
Phillipson illustrates twenty successful arbitrations, recorded largely in
Herodotus or Plutarch. See 2 PHILLIPSON, supra note 17, at 138-65; see also MARCUS
NIEBUHR TOD, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMONGST THE GREEKS (Clarendon Press 1913);
DEREK ROEBUCK, ANCIENT GREEK ARBITRATION (Holo Books 2001 ).
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crowded law courts and the most developed body of laws,S 0 there was
considerable agreement as to the gist of laws governing disputes
across Hellas. 51 That law, both statutory and customary, was believed
by both Spartans and Athenians to be a matter for general obedience.
Archidamus held the Spartans wise because "we are educated with
too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a selfcontrol to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in
useless matters. " 52 Likewise, Pericles praised Athenians whose
relations among themselves were without fear owing to "our chief
safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws,
particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they
are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which,
although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged
disgrace. " 53
The question relevant to this Essay is not whether the Greeks
had a reverence for law, but which ideas regarding law that governed
the cities themselves prevailed. The answer is that the cities appear,
at least to Thucydides, to be in the position of any other litigant before
the pan-Hellenic law: a city could be found to violate the law and be
fined or otherwise punished, just as could a general or private citizen.
On that principle, in their · disputes underlying their claims to
arbitration, the Corinthians claimed rights under law against the
Corcyraeans, and Thucydides appears to accept this claim as
appropriate. 54 Likewise, the Plataeans, after their defeat in 527, in a
tribunal they saw as failing to meet the procedural requirements of
custom, 55 argued to the Spartans that they had freely surrendered to
them and so should not be slaughtered under Hellenic law. This
argument failed to convince the Spartans, whose Theban allies argued
that the Plataeans did not deserve clemency for their surrender but
rather trial, also under Hellenic law, for their prior offenses in killing
50. Indeed, Athens grew both rich and hated for its role as the Hellene courthouse. See
PW, supra note 20, 1.77.1-1.77.4 (indignation), 6.91.7 (riches).
51. Most histories of Greek law are predominantly concerned with Athenian law, of
which we tend to have much better records. For a general introduction, see JoHN WALTER
JONES, THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS: AN INTRODUCTION (Clarendon Press
1956). Contemporary research is reflected in the essays of THE LAW AND THE COURTS IN
ANCIENT GREECE (Edward M. Harris & Lene Rubinstein eds., Duckworth 2004), and for the
purposes of this Essay, particular attention might be drawn to Angelos Chaniotis, JustifYing
Territorial Claims in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: The Beginnings of International Law,
in id. at 185.
52. PW, supra note 20, 1.84.1.
53. /d. 2.37.3.
54. /d. 1.41.
55. /d. 3.53.1.
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Theban youths during the battle of Coronaea. 56 All sides understood
the inviolability of temples in invaded lands, as well as the limited
nature of rights over temples after a conquest. 57
One ofThucydides' most interesting passages on Hellenic law
demonstrates the possibility of what modern theorists would call
horizontal enforcement. An important pan-Hellenic law established a
truce for participation in the Olympic games. 58 In 420, Elis
unilaterally declared a fine of two thousand minae against Sparta for
war against it during the truce, a fine the Spartans refused to pay. The
Eleans, who were near Olympia and placed troops at the site of the
games, barred the Spartans from attending. 59
The two aspects of pan-Hellenic law that powerfully affected
intermunicipal relations and themselves served as institutional
commitments were customs regarding treaties and envoys. In his
history, Thucydides more than recounts the effects of treaties; he
chronicles negotiations and offers to enter treaties in great detail. He
presents the drafts and texts of treaties as often as he apparently
could, and he presents the later arguments for compliance or breach in
great detail as well. 60
Treaties were given great reverence, sometimes written in
public, as in the inscription of the Argos-Athenian treaty in the agora
of the Acropolis. 61 Although the term pacta sunt servanda was not
coined until much later, 62 a strong custom honoring treaties existed.
Treaties were significant for good reason: they quite often worked.
Treaties upheld countless truces and alliances, and even the muchvaunted thirty-years' treaty between Athens and Sparta led to a truce
lasting fourteen. 63
56. /d. 3.67.6. The battle ofCoronea is mentioned in 1.113.2, although the slaughter of
the youths is not particularly mentioned there.
57. !d. 4.97-4.98.
58. On violation of an Olympic truce, see id.
59. See id. 5.48-5.50.
60. See, e.g., id. 5.41, the proposal of the treaty between Argos and Sparta, and its
adoption and text, id. 5.77-5.79, or the negotiations and drafts of the treaty in 412 between
Sparta and Persia, id. 8.36-8.37, 8.57-8.58. Most notably, see the negotiations between
Athens and Sparta for the fifty years' treaty and its text. /d. 5.1 7-5.19, 5.23.
61. /d. 5.47. I 1.
62. The term itself appears to have originated with Pufendorf. See SAMUEL F. VON
Puf'ENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 3.4 (James Brown Scotted., C. & W.
Oldfather trans., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1934) (summarium,
Amsterdam 1688); Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L.
405 (1994).
63. PW, supra note 20, 1.155.1, 2.2.1.
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The other requirement for pan-Hellenic cooperation that
depended on its laws was the protection of envoys, or ambassadors,
and heralds. These officers are a constant presence throughout the
narrative. 64 As a rule, envoys and heralds were not harmed, but rather
protected under the ancient religious obligations toward guests65-as
well as more specific but still long-standing customs for envoys,
particularly heralds, who alone could travel safely in time of war. 66
Although these customs were occasionally reinforced by treaty, 67
Thucydides never mentions a treaty as a basis for the treatment of
envoys.
In the main, diplomatic agents appear to have been left
unmolested, either by their recipient city or by cities whose lands they
traversed on their journeys. There were, of course, exceptions, which
Thucydides notes. Athenians captured Persian envoys to Sparta68 and
killed both Spartan envoys and a Corinthian envoy to Persia. 69
Themistocles held envoys as hostages. Such breaches of immunity,
however, were rare.
In sum, it would seem that Thucydides presents a variety of
institutions that could recognize customary laws governing intermunicipal conduct. Each was relatively weak, and none was capable
of long-standing enforcement of legal norms without the cooperation
of at least some of the cities. This cooperation depended as much on
political exigency as on a sense of legal obligation, yet Thucydides
depicts generals, ephors, and the rest responding to such obligations,
based on customs, some of which are greatly detailed.
It is fair to conclude that a weak institutional system of intermunicipal law existed and was capable of recognizing and
adjudicating claims of a law of war. In the light of that conclusion,
the questions then become whether there are rules of sufficient
specificity of jus ad bellum and jus in bello to be meaningfully
recognized and adjudicated by the institutions.

64. Strassler's index records seventy-nine mentions or descriptions of different
diplomatic missions. STRASSLER, LANDMARK, supra note 20, at 659--60, 688. There are
dozens more not indexed.
65. See GABRIEL HERMAN, RITUALISED FRIENDSHIP AND THE GREEK CITY 53
(Cambridge University Press 1987).
66. PW, supra note 20, 2.1. As to diplomatic immunity generally, see BEDERMAN,
ANTIQUITY, supra note 17, at 110-14.
67. See BEDERMAN, ANTIQUITY, supra note 14, at 109 n.117 (construing rightly two
treaties ensuring ambassadorial immunity as reflecting custom).
68. PW, supra note 20, 4.50.3.
69. Id. 2.67.
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0BLIGATIONS OF JUS AD BELLUM

Thucydides was greatly concerned with the arguments offered
for war, and the majority of the speeches he reproduced or invented
concerned grounds for war. 70 While his arguments included a
considerable breadth of economic and political interests/' they also
turned on causes that both reflected those interests and stood alone.
The law presumed peace, which could be broken only for an
acceptable cause, although causes were not difficult to assign in most
cases. The most common cause was probably self-defense, 72 but there
were also interference with a right established by custom or treaty, 73
violation of a duty by a colony to a parent city, 74 and interference with
an ally. 75
Other aspects of an elemental jus ad bellum are also
discernable.
Neutrality was, with some famous exceptions,
recognized and respected. Although the fate of the Melians made
clear that at least the Athenians did not regard respect for neutrals as
an unbreakable obligation, 76 in other circumstances, neutrality was
sufficiently upheld by the combatants to demonstrate a custom of its
respect. 77
70. The debate and twenty-six political speeches in Thucydides have been carefully
studied for millennia. For interesting recent studies along the lines above, see CLIFFORD
0RWIN, THE HUMANITY OF THUCYDIDES 30---63 (Princeton University Press 1994), and a new
consideration of the classic argument that Thucydides' narrative is one of stasis and kinesis,
in which (among other things) war destroyed peace, in JONATHAN J. PRICE, THUCYDIDES AND
INTERNAL WAR (Cambridge University Press 2001).
71. As to the fundamental interests at work in the war, I think it best merely to endorse
a marvelous study of the competing reasons in Thucydides and his commentators, that
despite red herrings and alternatives, Thucydides truly believed that the truest cause was
Spartan fear of domination by Athens. See GEORGE CAWKWELL, THUCYDIDES AND THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 20-39 (Routledge 1997). That argument did not, however, exclude the
legal obligation to aid her allies. See CHRISTOPHER PELLING, LITERARY TEXTS AND THE
GREEK HISTORIAN 87-90 (Routledge 2000).
72. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (concerning the Spartan arguments
against Athens).
73. See, e.g., PW, supra note 20, 1.67.1 (stating that the Megarians complained of being
barred from Athenian ports in violation of their treaty).
74. See, e.g., id. 1.15.4 (describing Corinthian complaints against Corcyraeans' failure
to give honor to the mother country).
75. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (concerning Athenian support of the
Corcyraeans ).
76. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (concerning Athenian argument at
Melos).
77. See PW, supra note 20, 7.33.2, 7.50.1, 7.58.1 (discussing Agrigentum's neutrality,
which required it to drive out its Spartan faction); see also id. 2.9.2 (dealing with Argos),
6.88.1-6.88.2 (dealing with Camarina).
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OBLIGATIONS OF JUS IN BELLO

In many ways, modem historians and military theorists seem
either surprised or appalled by the degree to which Greek warfare was
bounded by customs that constrained battles to certain seasons and
tactics, and turned such battles into duels between warriors. 78 The
Greeks, at least in battle with one another, were restrained by a
variety of customs in their battle strategies, tactics, and conduct. 79
Some battle customs of the Greek hoplites form a foundation for the
rest of the battlefield, in which heavily armed soldiers in similar
formations face one another, cavalry, and missile-launching light
troops, fighting until one army retreats. 80 Beyond the moments of
actual combat, however, Thucydides relates many further customs.
The most notable is the nearly uniform respect for a truce,
granted by the victor to allow the vanquished either to retrieve its
dead or to receive them from the victor's soldiers. 81 This respect was
so great and the practice so essential that Thucydides notes specially
two occasions when the losing side fled without requesting this
right. 82 Another custom following battle concerned the trophy, a
physical monument erected by the victorious army or fleet on or near
the battlefield. 83 Thucydides recounts dozens of trophies, 84 including
several in which both sides claimed victory and erected their own. 85
78. See, e.g., VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR: INFANTRY BATILE
GREECE 9-18 (Oxford University Press 1990).
79. The most exhaustive study of the customs of Greek warfare is undoubtedly the
monumental study by Pritchett, little of which will be restated here. See 1-5 W. KENDRICK
PRITCHETT, THE GREEK STATE AT WAR (University of California Press 1971-1991).
80. The most detailed description is of the battle of Man tinea in 418. PW, supra note
20, 4.73.4-5.69.1.
81. See, e.g., id. 1.63.3 (Athenians return dead to Potideans under truce at Chalcidice,
432), 2.92.4 (Athenians return dead under truce to Spartans at Naupactus, 429), 3.109
(Athenians give truce to Spartans to recover dead at Amphilocia, 426), 6.103.1 (Athenians
return Syracusan dead under truce at Syracuse, 414), 7.45.1 (Syracusans give truce to
Athenians to recover their dead at Syracuse, 413), 8.106.4 (Athens returns Spartan dead
under truce at Hellespont, 411 ). There are more examples throughout the narrative.
82. See id. 3.113.5. (Ambraciots forget to ask Athenians at Amphilocia, 426), 7. 72.27.75.3 (Athenians too demoralized to ask Syracusans at Syracuse, 413).
83. The Greek trophy has attracted considerable scholarly attention, but the best
commentary remains Pritchett's. See PRITCHETT, supra note 79, at 246-75.
84. STRASSLER, LANDMARK, supra, note 20, at 704 (indexing forty-nine trophies);
PRITCHETT, supra note 79, at 270 (counting fifty-eight trophies).
85. Thucydides recorded this happening five times. See PW, supra note 20, 1.54
(Corinth and Corcyra at Sybota, 433), 2.92.4-2.92.5 (Athens and Sparta at Naupactos, 429),
4.134 (Mantineia and Tegea at Laodocian, 423), 7.54 (Syracuse and Athens at Syracuse,
414), 1.105.6 (Athens erected a trophy for a victory over Corinth at Poteidaia, but the
Corinthians erected another one twelve days later).
IN CLASSICAL
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The fascinating aspect of this practice is that the losing side did not
violate the victor's trophy. The strength of the custom is particularly
apparent when one considers that the victors often left the field after
brief control of it, while the vanquished remained subjugated but, if
alive, nearby.
Other aspects of combat and its aftermath were not much
regulated. Weapons, while subject to the custom of hoplite combat
already mentioned, were otherwise subject to few rules. While
missiles had once been outlawed by agreement, peltasts, or
javelineers, had become accepted on the battlefield. Greek fire, the
poisoning of wells, and the use of corpses to weaken besieged
populations were employed. 86
Neutrality during battle was respected, though, as it was in
war. Temples, priests, and athletes en route to competition were
given protection by all. 87 What to a modem eye seems shocking is
that such protections were not extended to women or to children, who
were usually enslaved following the capitulation of a city. 88 Further,
soldiers routinely destroyed food supplies, further imperiling
noncombatants. 89 Lastly, prisoners were routinely enslaved and often
executed, 90 although the law distinguished between prisoners who had
surrendered (and were not to be killed) from those who were captured
(and so could beV' Most prisoners, however, were kept as slaves,
sometimes sold92 and sometimes returned at an armistice or truce. 93
This brief selection of some central aspects of the Greek jus in
bello is hardly exhaustive of the field. Again, it is not intended to do
86. See, e.g., id. 4.100.1-4.100.5 (describing Boeotians' use of flame-device to capture
Delium); ADRIENNE MAYOR, GREEK FIRE, POISON ARROWS, AND SCORPION BOMBS:
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (Duckworth 2003).
87. See PW, supra, note 20, 4.118.1, 4.97 (concerning temples, particularly Delphi).
The rule regarding athletes applied not only to Olympians, as we have seen, but also to
individuals, with Demosthenes' escape from the Argives at Epidarus serving as an example.
/d. 5.80.3.
88. Id. 1.89.3, 5.3.4, 5.32.1, 5.116.4. However, at least one treaty, between Argos and
Sparta, led to the restoration of children enslaved after combat. I d. 5.77.1-5.77.3.
89. The Peloponnesian strategy was to invade in time to destroy the crops in Attica.
See, e.g., id. 2.19.2, 2.23.3, 2.47.2, 2.55.1, 2.57.2, 3.1.2, 3.26, 4.2.1, 7.19.1. The Athenians
burned crops in Sicily. Id. 6.94.2-6.94.3. Cattle and beasts of burden were fair game as
well. See id. 8.31.1.
90. Id. 1.108, 3.32.1.
91. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
92. Some seven thousand Athenians were held for two months in quarries before being
sold by the Syracusans. PW, supra note 20, 7.87.2.
93. See, e.g., id. 4.38.1--4.41.1 (Cleon holds Spartan from Pylos at Athens), 5.3.1-5.3.4
(Chalcidians release seven hundred prisoners), 5.42.1 (Boeotians release Athenians).
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more than illuminate certain aspects of Thucydides' narration of the
war, in an effort to discern if there is sufficient evidence there to
support rules for a law of war that would be necessary to support legal
institutions. It is clear that, while the rules are heavily circumscribed,
rules arising from custom were clear and followed, usually, by the
warriors themselves.
VIII.

THE RING OF MODERNITY

Thucydides does not appear to have intended to present a
comprehensive and coherent view of the laws and customs of war.
But in narrating the great war of his age, he does depict aspects of the
laws and customs of war that, in the context of weak institutions of
varying formality, support a claim that some form of a law of war
existed among the cities of fourth century Greece.
This form of the law of war patently evolved without
satisfying many of the preconditions we ordinarily associate with the
modem law of war. Further, much of it was based not on treaty or
statute, but on custom. While an analog between the modem state
and the ancient city can be drawn, the absence of a system of states on
a Eurocentric, post-Westphalian model does not seem to have
prevented a weak case of a legal system from evolving, with
sufficient institutional apparatus and a sufficiently comprehensive
array of rules governing conduct.
Given this conclusion, it is perhaps fair to assert that a prima
facie case has been made in Thucydides that not only the law of war
but also international law existed in a meaningful way in the classical
Greek world. If that case holds, several conclusions can be drawn
from it. First, the differences between conditions ancient and modem
allow for a comparative analysis that is not as easily drawn for this
field from opposing national laws, when the law itself must have a
pan-national character. Second, it would seem that the historical
continuum of international law is not only a valid but also a useful
aspect of its study.
This Essay has not explored fully the limits of the Greek laws
of war, particularly their application (or inapplicability) to the armies
of non-Greeks, nor has it offered a full rationale for the arguments
that justified the rules and institutions, particularly the complicated
inter-relationship between war and religion in Greek society, the
problems of reciprocity, or the Hellene character. Still, in considering
how a single text illuminates institutions and rules by which the
Greeks brought some order to war, we might fmd reasons to believe
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that our current conceptions of the law of war may be re-examined,
and fmd that they, too, may apply in less formal circumstances than
the contemporary model demands. That, perhaps, may turn out to be
the modern ring one hears across two and a half millennia.

